This paper analyzes the Korean biotechnology sector with an analytical framework of National Innovation System (NIS). We examine whether newly industrializing economies (NIEs) can catch up with advanced economies in newly-emerging, knowledge-intensive industries such as biotechnology. We demonstrate that Korea is emerging as a key player in the global biotechnology scene in terms of R&D activities, catching up with other advanced countries, such as Japan, and keeping pace with regional competitors like Taiwan, Singapore and China. While the substantial increase in innovation capabilities lends support to the plausibility of the catching-up view, we also find that improvements and adaptations need to be made in transferring knowledge effectively from public to private sector and in commercializing biotechnology with the institutional support of 
INTRoDUCTIoN
As national markets are ever more exposed to global competition, national variations in industry performance have resulted in renewed interest among policymakers and scholars alike in the institutions that help generate national competitive advantage (Amsden, 2001; Best, 2001; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Nelson, 1998) . Emerging hightechnology industries are those which rely increasingly on knowledge creation and acquisition processes than on ownership of physical assets (Murtha et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2005) . Hence, national performance variations in these industries are largely determined by how well the process of simultaneously managing the stocks and flows of knowledge is implemented within and across economies (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996; DeCarolis & Deeds, 1999) .
Although these emerging industries become more globally integrated than ever before, studies have shown that knowledge continues to flow more readily within regional and national boundaries (e.g., Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Saxenian, 1994; Spencer, 2003; Tallman et al., 2004) . Recently, strategic management and innovation studies researchers have shifted their emphasis from individual firms to interorganizational networks and technological communities to which those firms belong in the analysis of their innovation output (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Gulati, 1998; Baum et al., 2000; Powell et al., 1996; Walker et al., 1997; Mowery et al 1996; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Rosenkopf & Tushman, 1998) .
In assessing innovation performance, Mathews brings into focus the competence of the economy as a whole to specialize and configure its resources (2001) . He argues that, in the case of East Asian economies, success in knowledge-intensive industries does not rely so much on the building of individual firm-level capabilities as it does on the ability of the economies to develop institutional mechanisms for acquiring collective competence in the specialization and configurations of resources and knowledge (Matthew, 2003) .
Our aim in this paper is to examine whether newly industrializing economies (NIEs) can catch up with advanced economies in such newlyemerging, knowledge-intensive industries as biotechnology. We attempt to address this question with an illustration of the Korean biotechnology sector viewed through an analytical framework of National Innovation System (NIS), which helps us focus on the way in which knowledge of a specific country is generated and diffused in the innovation process. Our study will foster our understanding of the mechanisms by which collective competence of managing knowledge creation and diffusion is acquired in a less-developed economy.
Our arguments draw on two broad theoretical perspectives. First, by emphasizing the role of technology and innovation in the long-run economic growth, we take an approach that is inherently Schumpeterian (Schumpeter, 1955; Winter, 2006) . Second, we take a generally institutional perspective and hence our view is in line with the notion of comparative institutional advantage (Hall & Soskice, 2001) . Advocates of this concept argue that the industries in which countries specialize depend not only on the relative factor costs of classical trade theory, but on the national institutional frameworks in which a country's producers are embedded (Soskice, 1997 (Soskice, , 1999 Casper et al., 1999; Whitley, 2000 Whitley, , 2002 .
The analytical framework we employ in the examination of the Korean biotechnology innovation system is compatible with the institutional perspective since the NIS approach has emanated from the fundamental realization that institutional configurations, more specifically, national institutional contexts matter when it comes to analyzing how technological capabilities are built, sourced, diffused, and harnessed (Freeman, 1995 , Nelson 1993 Lundvall, 1999; Edquist, 1997) .
This paper is structured as follows: we first recapitulate the theoretical debate on the sources of national competitiveness. Secondly, we review some of the key premises of the NIS approach and assess its utility in innovation research in general. Next, we depict the evolution of the biotechnological sector in general and then that of Korea through the conceptual lense of the NIS. This is followed by a conclusion.
THEoRETICAL BACKgRoUND
While the field of strategic management has been weighing the relative impact of industry vs. firm specificity on firm-level performance, some other scholars have been grappling with the question of national variance in economic performance and competitiveness. Among these, several researchers began to pay special attention to the process of innovation manifested at regional, national, and supranational levels (e.g., Freeman, 1994 Freeman, , 1995 Lundvall, 1988 Lundvall, , 1992 Saxenien, 1995; Archibugi & Michie, 1995) .
More ambitiously, some sociopolitically-oriented scholars have developed comparative models of contemporary capitalism on a systemic level in an attempt to appreciate the empirical reality of divergent economic development paths taken by different countries, and their resulting impact on economic performance (e.g., Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1994; Hollingsworth & Boyer, 1997) . Drawing on the concept of comparative institutional advantage, Casper and Whitely (2004) demonstrate that European economies can innovate as successfully as that of the US in high-tech industries. However, according to Casper and Whitely (2004) , they do so not by radically altering their institutional frameworks to mimic the US model, but by seeking sub-segments within given technological fields in which firms can hold long-standing comparative institutional advantage. For instance, Germany and Sweden specialized in such sub-sector as platform biotechnologies not as a second-best solution, but because their institutional systems create advantages in resolving the organizational, managerial dilemmas that characterize these sub-sectors in which complex organizational structures focused on competence-enhancing human resource management are required.
Despite differences in their levels of analysis and modes of explanation, these two perspectives -the NIS approach and the varieties of capitalism approach -share a common understanding that economic change is a fundamentally historical and institutionally-embedded process. Equally disillusioned with the atomic nature of neoclassical economic theory, evolutionary economics scholarship is also interested in the process by which economic change and technological development is generated and spread at micro/ macro levels (e.g., Nelson & Winter, 1982 ). Yet, the theoretical focus of this perspective is rather different from the above two approaches, which are more explicitly geared toward incorporating institutional dimensions in their theorizing.
Empirical studies under the rubric of evolutionary theorizing typically involve a multitude of heterogeneous firms searching for more efficient techniques of production and better products in the competitive markets. Differential performance and growth potential of economic actors are determined by differential success in the searching process manifested in their concomitant behavior and strategies (Dosi et al., 1999) . What evolutionary economics claims is that the nature and direction of market selection is determined in large part by the accessibility of technological opportunities, the level of technology diffusion and economic actors' ability to absorb and augment their knowledge through organizational routines. On the aggregate level, evolutionary economists see a country's level of technological competence as the basic factor constraining its productivity, and its technological advance as the central driving force behind economic growth (Dosi et al., 1999; Dosi & Winter, 2000 , Dosi & Coriat, 1998 . However, although they admit that such economic institutions as intellectual property regimes, nonbusiness organizations, antitrust and regulatory authorities, universities and government research institutes play a key role, institutions have not as yet featured prominently in their analysis based on simulation modeling (Dosi & Coriat, 1998; Nelson & Sampat, 2001) . In general, implicit in all three theoretical perspectives is an assumption that 181 economic activity is embedded in wider institutional structures, albeit with differing gradations of institutional flavor.
THE CoNCEpTUAL FRAmEwoRK oF NATIoNAL INNovATIoN SySTEm
Notably, the past two decades have observed the NIS approach growing into something of a distinct research program in its own right (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994; Lundvall, 1988) . In an effort to transcend the limits of the neo-classical paradigm, which still omits or downplays the importance of innovation in its account of economic growth (the exception being endogenous growth theory), the NIS scholars closely examine the ways in which innovations are created and diffused in an economy (Lundvall, 1988; Lam, 2000) . On the methodological front, the NIS applies a textured description of patterns of activity that contribute to innovative behavior in specific countries. Furthermore, by identifying specific institutions and actors that play decisive roles in given industries, it emphasizes idiosyncrasies in national approaches to innovation (Nelson, 1993; Dosi, 1988; Edquist, 1997) .
Scholarly work by Freeman (1995) , Nelson (1993) , and Lundvall (1998) has been usually associated with the concept of NIS, and indeed these authors have been frequently credited with inspiring further research interest into this line of inquiry among both academic scholars and policy-makers. The actual concept itself was often said to have been used in earnest during the 1980s in Freeman's analysis of Japan's domestic context although Freeman also credited Lundvall with using the term first (Freeman, 1995, p. 5) . Most researchers working under the conceptual framework of NIS appear to subscribe to Nelson's (1993) somewhat broad definition of the term. Nelson defines national systems of innovation as "… a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance of national firms". In a similar vein, Lundvall (1994) describes it as "… the elements and relationships, which interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, economically useful knowledge … and are either located within or rooted inside the border of a nation state."
Broadly, the NIS approach is based on three discrete, yet intimately interconnected theoretical premises. First, in the NIS approach technological development and innovation are explicitly taken as the driving engine behind economic progress (e.g., Schumpeter, 1955) . Although this view is now taken for granted or, at least, widely accommodated amongst scholars, it was not until recently that economists have come out with a set of plausible explanations concerning the causality between these two variables. Second, the NIS approach is firmly grounded in the observation that economic 182 agents, such as national economies and firms, innovate predominantly because they are compelled to do so in order to survive and succeed in a competitive environment. Adner and Levinthal call this kind of explanation for technology evolution a supply-side explanation and offer an alternative account by developing argument based on demand heterogeneity (2001, pp. 611-628) . As globalization prevails, the extent of competition that domestic firms encounter has more than doubled (Batholomew, 1997; Howells & Michie, 1997; Michie & Prendergast, 1997) . At the same time, in today's rapidly changing world economy the value of knowledge has amplified (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994) . The increasingly global nature of competition coupled with the advent of the knowledge-based economy is another important premise on which the NIS research has been based. A third, arguably most distinct premise of the approach of NIS is that institutional configurations, more specifically, national institutional contexts matter when it comes to analyzing how technological capabilities are built, sourced, diffused, and harnessed (Freeman, 1995 , Nelson 1993 Lundvall, 1999; Edquist, 1997) .
The question then arises: how relevant the analytical concept of NIS is in this seemingly globalizing economies and technology. If we agree that the validity of an analytical framework stems in large part from the extent of its explanatory power of real world phenomena, we have to address how the NIS approach permit us to better explain the complex process of innovation. Undoubtedly, economic life has become global on an unprecedented scale as testified by continuously soaring trade and investment volumes across national borders (Howells and Michie, 1997; Metcalfe, 2001; Batholomew, 1997) . MNCs have also altered the face of the world economy in the direction of globalization (Cantwell, 1992; Batholomew, 1997) . Some scholars even claim that "… national borders are losing their meaning as economic frontiers …" (Ohmae, 1990) . While some scholars of globalization concede that global integration and local differentiation may not stand at the opposite ends of the single continuum, a growing divide has arisen between proponents and opponents of globalization (e.g., Baker et al., 1998; Hirst and Thompson, 1999) . In this context, the concept of enduring national differences in innovative capabilities has been intensely challenged by proponents of globalization (Archibugi et al., 1999) . For example, skeptics of the NIS framework contend that the phenomenal growth of international R&D networks signals the convergence of technological capabilities across countries.
However, it is not yet clear whether heightening cross-national R&D activities through such arrangements as joint ventures, strategic alliances, consortia render the notion of durable national differences in technological capabilities redundant. Lundvall (1988 Lundvall ( , 1992 points out that national boundaries remain to be important because long-183 term interactive learning is most likely to occur within a setting where there are few cultural constraints for the transfer of tacit knowledge and where trust relationships are more likely to emerge. Furthermore, Malerba et al. (1999) propose that, apart from characteristics of the relevant knowledge base, a combination of availability of opportunity, appropriability conditions and degree of cumulativeness of technological knowledge make a technological regime contextspecific. What is implicit in this view is that technological regimes might well be susceptible to specific national institutions. For example, high degrees of appropriability, which is determined at the nationallevel, by limiting the extent of knowledge spillovers and by allowing successful innovators to maintain their competitive advantages, tend to result in a lower number of entrants and a higher level of industrial concentration. Conversely, by discouraging investments on the part of incumbents in innovative activities and yet by permitting a wider diffusion of knowledge across firms, low appropriability conditions are more likely to lead to a sectoral structure characterized by the presence of spatially localized knowledge spillovers and hence a large population of entrants (Malerba et al., 1999) .
To sum up, although there exists an inherent tension between the internationalizing trend of economy and technological development and the continued relevance of national institutions, the analytical framework of NIS is useful as long as not only the nature of technology but also the institutional conditions of production of a particular technology influences the strength of incentives and constraints innovating organizations face and the nature of the problems they have to solve in their innovative activities. Powell and Snellman (2004) define the knowledge economy as production of goods and services based on knowledge-intensive activities that contribute to an accelerated pace of technological and scientific advance as well as equally rapid obsolescence. In recent years, it has been increasingly recognized that science and technology, as key elements in the process of knowledge production and transformation, are instruments of growing economic value and thus enable firms to compete in a global environment.
BIoTECHNoLogy INNovATIoN SySTEm
As an enabling technology, biotechnology helps deploy organic properties to obtain therapeutic substances, to produce and transform foods, to solve environmental problems, and so forth. While traditionally biotechnology was used to employ the properties of living things as they are found in nature, recent biotechnology use genetically modified organisms to produce specific substances or to improve various processes 184 (Biotechnology Industry Association, 2005) . Accordingly, biotechnology applies science-based techniques that rely on the knowledge produced by a wide set of disciplines, ranging from microbiology and chemical engineering to molecular biology, immunology and genetics (Ernst and Young, 2002) . In this regard, multidisciplinarity is a critical feature of knowledge production in biotechnology.
In many respects, biotechnology represents the epitome of the knowledge-economy. Yet, biotechnology is not an industry per se, but a set of technologies with the potential to transform various fieldspharmaceuticals, chemicals, agriculture, veterinary science, medicine, environmental science (Biotechnology Industry Association, 2005). As such, many researchers (e.g., Barley and Freeman, 1992; Amburgey et al., 1994) treat the wide array of biotechnology firms as comparable. Consequently, the characteristics of biotechnology -rapid changes in evolutionary trends, multidisciplinarity, combination of relatively old technologies with new ones -necessitates an understanding of the coevolution of old and new industries and their adaptation to a strongly competitive environment (Orsenigo, 1989; Murray, 2002) .
There are mainly two reasons why national institutions matter in innovation in biotechnology. First, since innovative performance in biotechnology depends on the capability to carry out scientific research, individual research scientists are the critical locus of knowledge creation. These individuals are employed by public or private research institutes and follow career paths that shape their choices about the kinds of organizations, which, in turn, determine which organizations have access to their knowledge. A central argument made is that specific institutions governing the careers of these scientists tend to pattern knowledge flows across organizations (Gittelman, 2005) . These institutional patterns are national by nature and have measurable consequences for technological performance of a given nation.
Second, innovation in this domain is characterized by dense interorganizational networks and knowledge flows across organizations (Powell et al., 1996) . Operating in a science-based industry, biotechnology firms rely heavily on the exchange of knowledge with universities and public research organizations. To a large extent, knowledge flow between public and private sector is shaped by national institutions. Among private firms, small dedicated firms and established firms alike, each has complementary capabilities to offer in the production of knowledge and commercialization of discoveries. The degree to which a start-up is encouraged and supported is also influenced by the institutional conditions of a national economy as a whole.
BIoTECHNoLogy IN KoREA
Given that biotechnology sector as a newly-emerging, knowledgeintensive industry demands different institutional arrangements from other sectors, it is timely to ask whether newly industrializing economies (NIEs) can catch up with industrialized economies in this sector. We seek to address this question with an illustration of the Korean biotechnology industry viewed through an analytical framework of National Innovation System (NIS), which helps us focus on the way in which resources and knowledge of a specific country are generated and diffused in the innovation process.
Studies on emerging economies in East Asia have shown that latecomer firms in these countries have achieved successful manufacturing performance through assimilation of foreign technology under state-led industrial policy coupled with developmental institutional environment (i.e., Amsden, 1989; Hobday, 1995; Kim 1997; World Bank, 1993) .
Recognizing that technological accumulation in the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) requires considerable learning efforts of their own in order to internalize and improve on the imported technology, scholars have attributed the rapid technological catching-ups of these nations, in particular, that of Korea, to their production technology capability and project execution capability (Amsden, 1989) .
In the case of Korea, capability acquisition of its firms with respect to production technology accelerated through turnkey plants, machinery imports and reverse engineering. In his in-depth study on the Korean electronics industry, Kim (1997) suggests that local R&D and engineering efforts also played an important role in preparing the industry for implementing its own process technology and later product technology. Furthermore, Amsden (1989) points that investment capability or project execution capability of many firms in Korea was derived from their working with foreign firms' personnel on a series of capital expansions.
When a country is far from technological frontiers, it can grow quickly by licensing and imitating technology. The major task here is to manage the flow of resources -that is, to carry out the investment required by imitation. However, when a country is on the frontier, it can only grow quickly by innovating (Amsden and Hikino, 1994) , which requires managing the flow of ideas and resources equally. As latecomer countries are approaching the new technological frontiers, some of their leading firms, especially in semiconductor and electronics industries, have grown to challenge incumbent firms in advanced nations.
During this transition phase the firms in latecomer economies face new challenges and opportunities not only due to increased competition from firms in developed countries but also due to rapid technological 186 change and economic globalization (Hobday et al., 2004) . The global semiconductor industry, for instance, has been often presented as a vivid case signifying a power shift in competitive advantage among countries around the world (Hobday, 1995; Cho and Mathews, 1999; Kim, 1999) . More recently, the rapid expansion and huge market success of Korea's CDMA-based wireless telecommunications sector has started to attract growing interest among business practitioners and policy makers alike. Given the recent technological catching-ups and even leap-froggings in some of the knowledge-intensive industries, particularly in the semiconductor and mobile communication sectors, the evolution of the Korean biotechnological innovation system is worthy of special attention.
The world-wide emphasis on biotechnology is largely influenced by the phenomenal success of the US: in 1992, revenues from biotechnology in the US totalled US$8 billion, and by 2003 this amounted to US$40 billion. The number of the US biotech firms has soared, an event which illustrates how the conditions for the sector have improved despite the continuing difficulties and cost of R&D. In 2003, for example, the US biotechnology sector spent US$17.9 billion on R&D, which puts it ahead of those of other countries. This commitment to R&D has made US biotech firms successful in terms of new products. Firms such as Genentech, Amgen, Biogen, Chiron and Genzyme have performed impressively over the past 20 years and have brought to market breakthrough human therapeutic products. An additional benefit for the US biotechnology sector is that its success attracts those seeking to work in the field as evidenced by the increasing number of foreign students wish to gain experience with a US organization (RobbinsRoth, 2000).
Korea's biotechnology sector is often said to lag far behind its counterparts in advanced nations such as the United States. According to a survey by the US Commercial Service, in 2000, Korea was ranked 14th in terms of biotechnology R&D investment: Korean government biotechnology R&D investment was estimated as being 1% of the equivalent in the United States and 10% of Japanese government R&D biotechnology expenditure (US Commercial Service, 2003 ). Yet, looking into the evolution of the Korean biotechnology in terms of R&D spending as a proportion of GDP, the rapid growth of the sector seems obvious. During the early 1970s, total R&D spending in the country was just 0.31% of GDP, but by 2001 Korea's R&D expenditures had increased tenfold to nearly 3% of GDP -equalling Japan's (2.98%) and surpassing the US' (2.70%) and the UK's (1.86%). Moreover, in Korea, human therapeutic-based R&D accounted for 12% of all university-based research spending in 2001, and almost 20% of all university researchers were engaged in biomedical science R&D (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). Table 1 and Table 2 show the manpower and market composition of the Korean biotechnology industry. In terms of biotechnology R&D activity, Korea is emerging as a player in the global biotechnology scene. It is catching up with other advanced countries, such as Japan, and keeping pace with regional competitors like Taiwan, Singapore and China. There are other promising signs for the Korean biotechnology sector. In 1999, there were only 70 biotech start-ups in the country; but by 2003 this rose dramatically to 605. In parallel, in 2000 only one Korean biotechnology firm was publicly listed; by 2003, the number rose to 23. These de novo firms in Korea are focusing their efforts primarily on the development of new drugs, medical devices, bioinformatics and functional genomics research. Over one-third of biotechnology products being developed in Korea are in the biomedical field and the product pipeline continues to grow. In addition, over 40 Korean pharmaceutical firms have 130 new drugs in either phase 1 or 2 clinical trials. Some local biotech ventures, such as Macrogen and Bioneer, are capitalizing on the post-genome era, and are beginning to gain an international reputation in DNA sequencing and synthesis (Korea Biotechnology Venture Association, 2003) . Table 1 presents the examples of bio-products in Korea.
However, as most Korean biotechnology ventures are now seeking investments and exploring collaborations from abroad since few of them can remain viable on their own due to the rapidly changing nature of technology (Korea Biotechnology Venture Association, 2003). Attractions for overseas investment into Korea generally lie in the strengths of local firms in the areas ranging from fermentation technology, antibiotics, diagnostics, and Hepatitis B vaccine production to genomics, humanized monoclonal antibody production (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005). Table 2 shows the types and numbers of biotechnology firms in Korea. 
The public Funding for Biotechnology
The Korean government plays a significant leadership role in biotechnology innovation process and output. Recently, biotechnology has been singled out as one of the key industries for economic growth by the Korean government. In 1994, seven government ministries signed onto the 'Biotech 2000' plan, in which the government hoped to make the country one of the world's top seven biotechnology producing countries by 2010. To this end, in 2003 the Korean government held a biotechnology evaluation panel meeting during which it announced a total spending of US$540 million, which is a 19.8% increase in spending over that of the previous year (The Korea Times, 2005) . In Korea, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is responsible for allocating nearly half of the total national R&D budget focusing on basic research. For example, the MOST administers the 21st Century Frontier R&D Program, of which seven of 19 designated projects are in the biotechnology field. Working with elite research universities and publicly funded laboratories, such as the Korea Research Institute for Bioscience and Biotechnology (KRIBB) and the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST), MOST has financed new R&D laboratories specifically designated for embryonic stem cell research. On the other hand, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) focuses more on the applied biotechnology R&D. Using a similar approach to that of MOST, MOCIE provides direct subsidies and financial incentives for industrial R&D institutes. Table 3 shows the roles of different government ministries in biotechnology. 
National Institutions for the Creation & Diffusion of Knowledge
Recognizing that it must play an expanded role in stimulating the environment for its biotech industry, the Korean government has devised a longer-term plan known as 'the Bio-Star Project'. Launched in 2005 by the MOCIE, this 10-year plan is expected to result in a total of US$253 million being invested in the domestic biotech industry and feature cooperation between the government and business community. Not only focusing on funding research projects, the Bio-Star Project but also aims to aid those interested in commercializing biotech projects To promote collaborations with foreign firms, the MOCIE launched a task force consisting of the state-run Korea Trade and Investment Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) and other public and private organizations. The Ministry has also launched additional international exchange programmes to support the domestic biotech sector. These programmes do appear to be attracting interest. The MOCIE is also affiliated with the Korea Bio Venture Association (KOBIOVEN), which is attempting to support the emerging biotech sector. Operating since 2000, KOBIOVEN has attempted to drive growth of the domestic biotech industry by acting as a knowledge forum for its members. It has ten member firms at the core of its organization, whose expertise cover a range of areas such as proteomics, monoclonal antibody research and genomics.
Since the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW) controls relatively fewer resources for biotechnology R&D than either MOST or MOCIE, it focuses on facilitating technology transfer for health biotechnology products. To this end, the MOHW established the Health Technology Transfer Center in 2001. This technology transfer center not only prospects for new health-related technologies by maintaining close relationship with researchers, but it also helps entrepreneurs in valuing and marketing such technologies.
Legal Institutions governing the Korean Biotechnology Innovation
The Korean government is using public policy to improve a legal environment for biotechnology innovation. Recent progress has been made in providing a legal framework that gives greater intellectual property (IP) protection to firms, encouraging the growth of IP-dependent biotech enterprises. In an effort to further strengthen conformity with In the regulatory area, Korea has had relatively high standards in healthcare delivery and in ensuring the efficacy and safety of biotechnology products. In 1998, the government reorganized the Korean Food and Drug Administration (KFDA). The KFDA, which is modelled on the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), is now a centralized administrative agency legally overseen by the government, although in practice it functions as an autonomous regulatory institution.
public Institutions for Biotechnology Innovation
Public research institutes and universities are the biggest contributors to knowledge production on the basis of health biotechnology publications in internationally peer-reviewed journals. Korean publications in health biotechnology have been continuously increasing since the 1990s: universities were responsible for 89.4% of all Korean publications between 1991 and 2002. Public research institutes were the secondhighest contributor of publications in health biotechnology, accounting for 20.1%. Although the functions of research institutes and universities in Korea are similar, there are some differences. Unlike university R&D, which focuses exclusively on basic research, public research institutes tend to bridge basic and applied research.
Until the late 1980s, the main focus at almost all of the universities in Korea has been on teaching and education. As a result of various government programs to encourage research activities in the university, research activities in universities have been steadily increasing. For example, Seoul National University (SNU) is considered the country's premier research university, along with the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST). Between 1991 and 2002, SNU has been the institutional leader in health biotechnology publications in internationally peer-reviewed journals, publishing 23% of the total health biotechnology papers for the country, whereas KAIST accounted for 13%. SNU also houses the Stem Cell Research Center (SCRC). With a total budget of US $75 million spread over 10 years, the SCRC's R&D plans is divided into three phases, with the goal of clinical applications of adult and embryonic stem cells, such as the development by 2012 of gene therapies through transplantation of gene-modified stem cells.
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However, according to its 'technology roadmap,' the primary focus of the project is on basic research.
Public research institutes involved in health biotechnology knowledge production include KIST and KRIBB. Of the country's health biotechnology publications in internationally peer-reviewed journals between 1991 and 2002, these two institutes accounted for almost 15% of the total. The KIST administers the Functional Proteomics Centre (FPC) of which principal objective is to use proteomic analysis to identify new diagnostic markers and new drug targets. More specifically, the FPC is working on research for a range of cerebral, metabolic, cardiovascular and immune-related diseases. Unlike the SCRC at the SNU, it has a more focused plan for commercialization, reflecting the bridging role played by government research institutes. On the other hand, KRIBB hosts the Center for Functional Analysis of the Human Genome. With high incidences of liver cancer in Asian populations, the Center is targeting genomic research at liver and stomach cancers. Like the FPC, it has clearly defined commercialization objectives.
Collaboration between public and private Sectors in the Korean Biotechnology
In the past, the Korean government collaborated with the chaebols (predominantly large conglomerate firms) to orchestrate technology commercialization in the country. Well-known firms, such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai, benefited disproportionately when it came to foreign technology licensing agreements and securing industrial investment (Amsden, 1989; Hobday, 1995; Kim 1997 ). Yet, the emerging biotechnology sector faces a different environment. As centralized statecontrol over the biotechnology commercialization process has waned, the influence of the chaebols has relatively diminished and the role of small and medium-sized firms has grown in the biotechnology innovation process. The Technology Transfer Promotion Act of 1999 spurred the creation of new technology transfer centers to facilitate the commercialization of cutting-edge technology ventures throughout the nation (Biotechnology Industry Organization, 2005) . A wide range of public and private sector actors, including government ministries, major university and public research laboratories, business associations and private sector R&D consortia, are actively involved.
MOCIE has actively encouraged biotechnology clusters in the country. The most important biocluster is located in the Daeduk Science Town in Taejon. Built around the KRIBB and its Bio Venture Center (BVC), the Daeduk biocluster helps incubate new biotechnology firms. For example, Bioneer, a firm specializing in DNA synthesis, was initially incubated at the BVC. Since 2000, BVC researchers have spun off 16 start-ups, and the center itself has incubated 14 start-ups. Sparked by the network economies, the interactive synergies between entrepreneurs and research-based scientists in Daejeon are forging new opportunities for biotechnology firms.
Linkages between public research institutes and biotechnology firms are especially important in the early stages of industrial development in biotechnology. Although the Korean government has encouraged domestic biotechnology firms to collaborate with universities and government research institutes through government-supported R&D programs, collaborative research between public and private sector appears to have not yet proliferated: the number of collaborative research projects among domestic firms, for example, was only three of seventyfive domestic collaboration projects. Domestic collaboration accounted for only 11.8% of the total successful innovation cases identified. Productivity of the collaborative research in Korea was also very low. Only eight cases (9.6%) of eighty-three domestic collaboration research projects have been introduced to the market. Many key scientists at universities and government research institutes were heavily dependent on an informal private network for collaboration work with industry.
In spite of the strong incentives under the current system, technology transfer activities in universities and government research institutes were not very efficient. Few universities in Korea have the formal organization for transferring their inventions to industry. Since universities entrust all rights to individual scientists, the scientists themselves have to seek the purchasers of their inventions using the individual network, thus appropriate almost all of the returns earned from transferring their inventions to industry. As a result, universities do not serve as the market place in which their inventions can be transacted more efficiently. Although KRIBB has the formal organization for technology transfer, its activities seem to be not effective. Institutional environments can have significant influence on the rate and extent of innovation. In order to facilitate the commercialization of biotechnology in Korea, universities and government research institutes have to prepare for forming a formal organization or the rules for technology transfer to enhance transfer effectiveness.
The private Funding for Biotechnology
Since 2001, private sector funding for biotechnology innovation has markedly increased, accounting for nearly three-quarters of total R&D expenditures. This is due, in part, to the availability of private sector capital resources. As in the US, the increase in private funding for technology ventures is attributed to burgeoning venture capital (VC) market. The growth of the venture capital market in Korea, however, 195 had floundered until the mid-1990s: there were no more than eleven venture capital firms in 1986. Venture capital firms also lacked any useful means to ensure the profits incurred from their risk investments until KOSDAQ started in 1996.
As a result of government policy to promote the construction of ventures, the number of venture capital firms increased to fifty-three in 1996. In parallel, the domestic financial markets became liberalized during the mid-1990s. Aided by the activation of KOSDAC and the opening of domestic financial market, the venture capital industry has provided fledgling ventures and entrepreneur scientists to commercialize their inventions with useful means to raise required financial resources.
Despite the growth in the number of venture capital firms, relatively few new biotechnology ventures raised their financial resources from the venture capital market. Most venture businesses in biotechnology failed to convince venture capital firms of their growth potential. On the other hand, venture capital firms in Korea have not accumulated sufficient capabilities that would enable the growth potential of target portfolio firms to be effectively evaluated. Infrastructures established in a country for reducing firms' investment risks can have a significant influence on the development of biotechnology. Government may need to develop policy tools for activating the venture capital market so that the inventions of public research institutes can be transferred efficiently to biotechnology firms through licensing or starting-up of ventures.
CoNCLUSIoN
The recent technology and innovation strategies being pursued in emerging economies represent a profound shift in the way their governments approach economic stimulation. This can be construed as an aspiration on their part to transform the industrial landscapes of developmental states. For example, moving into the ranks of developed industrial states, Singapore is shifting away from FDI-driven industrialization to more knowledge-based, research-intensive economic development that follows a network mode of innovation by nurturing biotechnology SMEs as well as by attracting biotechnology MNCs. Indeed, recent government actions in Singapore indicate its intention to boost investment in higher education and public research to transform the country into a Southeast Asian hub of biotechnology R&D .
As yet, however, there have been relatively few studies on the issues related to technological transition of NICS into a more knowledgeintensive ecomomy. This study aimed to fill this gap in the technological catching-up literature on East Asian economies by exploring how 196 innovative competence in biotechnology is being developed in Korea. In this article, we have emphasized the connections between institutional frameworks and patterns of recent technological change. Specifically, in examining the evolutionary trajectory of Korea's biotechnology sector, we have drawn on the analytical framework of national innovation systems (NIS) subscribing to the idea that institutions matter to innovation process and performance by creating country-specific combinations of human capital with organizational capabilities in ways that matter for technological outcomes. Throughout the paper, we have highlighted the evolving logics of systems of innovation reflected in the Korean biotechnology sector.
Creating competitive industries has become one of the key tasks of governments. Different adaptation outcomes in industries across nations cannot be accounted for fully by emphasizing firm-level capabilities, market-driven policies, or state-level policies separately. Our analysis of innovation processes has identified the important role of government in promoting the biotechnology industry. When a country is far from the technological frontier, government can promote industrialization by actively directing the flow of resources to firms and encouraging firms to invest such resources in technological upgrading. When a country is close to the technological frontier, in contrast, the government can maximize innovation by playing a facilitating role that allows innovation networks to thrive without extensive interventions. As an emerging science-based industry, biotechnology requires new institutional arrangements for financing R&D, facilitating technology transfer, and coordinating innovation activities (Meyer-Krahmer, 1997) . In addition, the innovation system in biotechnology is likely to be highly regionalized, for example with regard to research and early exploitation, and highly globalized, for example, in terms of development as well as distribution and marketing (Dohse, 2000; EC, 2002) .
It would be difficult for most biotechnology firms in Korea to be a fullline producer from research to production in the global biotechnology market. To be a leader in the international niche market or a follower in the domestic market by being a licensee for the inventions developed in foreign countries can thus be feasible strategic alternatives for Korean biotechnology firms in the foreseeable fututure. Subsequently, the strategy of these small, dedicated biotechnology firms should differ according to the sector in which they operate and on the role they adopt, i.e. as radical innovators, as specialists in a niche-market or as suppliers of knowledge services (Saviotti, 1998) . Over time, industrial structure of biotechnology will be reorganized partly by private sector initiatives and partly by the support of public institutions. What is striking in the Korean innovation system of biotechnology is the prominent role of government in enhancing the generic capabilities of these organizations and in facilitating collaboration and knowledge flow between them.
